The Right of Men to Change their Names Upon Marriage by Rosensafi, Michael
THE RIGHT OF MEN TO CHANGE THEIR NAMES
UPON MARRIAGE
Michael Rosensaji'
"The name of a man is a numbing blow from which he never re-
covers. 1
INTRODUCTION
In her 1997 article, Omi Morgenstern Leissner described the fol-
lowing problem to her readers: "Fifteen months ago, as I was prepar-
ing for marriage, I found myself face-to-face with a dilemma from
which my future husband was spared-whether to keep my surname
or to swap it for his."2 I was married to joana Rosensaft on August 11,
2002 and changed my name from Michael Savere to Michael Rosen-
saft.3 Just five years later than Omi Morgenstern faced her dilemma, I
wish that my own was as easy. Since the early 197 0s, feminist groups
have, for the most part, successfully fought the male dominated prac-
tice of women being forced to adopt their husband's name upon• 4
marriage. Now, in all fifty states, a woman has the right either to re
tain her maiden name, or to take her husband's surname upon mar-
riage.' Sociologists had thought that once the right to maintain one's
maiden name was established it would become widespread; but sur-
J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 1999, Johns Hopkins University. I
am indebeted to Professor Catherine T. Stnve, Menachem Z. Rosensaft, and Joana D. Rosen-
saft whose insights and support were invaluable.
I MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 32 (1994).
2 Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Name of the Maiden, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 253, 253 (Fall
1997).
3 See Weddings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 9, at 11 ("'He realized the importance of my
family's name, which unfortunately all but died out during the Holocaust,' said Ms. Rosensaft,
an only child. 'Mike said he wanted to ensure the continuity not only of the name, but of the
legacy attached to the name."').
4 In the 1960s and early 1970s, women began actively seeking ways to retain their maiden
name upon marriage. Leissner, supra note 2, at 257. Beginning in 1972, many groups sprung
up across the United States to promote the right of women to retain their name. Priscilla Ruth
MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their Children, 3 LAW& INEQ. J. 91, 96 n.9 (1985). As
an example, one group still in existence that fought for this right was the Lucy Stone League.
The Lucy Stone League, available at http://www.lucystoneleague.org (last visited Aug. 30,
2002). These groups fought against this practice due to its patriarchal roots that originally sig-
nified that a woman was a man's property. See Jennifer Christman, The Name Game, ARK
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Mar. 8, 2000, at Fl.
.5 See MacDougall, supra note 4.
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prisingly, roughly ninety percent of women still adopt their husband's
name upon marriage. It was, however, the choice most feminists
were fighting for, not a requirement that women retain their own
name.7 The feminist fight was naturally never concerned with men's
marital name change rights. The discrimination that women once
faced in this realm has now turned into a right: the right to choose to
keep their maiden name or adopt their husband's name.' Men, how-
ever, never faced the discrimination of having to give up their name,
but likewise do not everywhere have an absolute right to do so. As
Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz remarked in her 1972 article: "It should be
noted that women have a wider choice of the use of names than men
have... ,9 Currently, men who want to change their names upon
marriage must worry about the formal statutory scheme for changing
one's name in their respective states. If the wife takes the groom's
name then it is as simple as filling out the marriage certificate, 0 but it
is not so easy for grooms.
The trend of men giving up their own names and taking their
wives' surnames has been growing in recent years in the United
States." However, only a handful of states give this right to men.
6 Patricia Wen, Tradition in Name Only, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 2001, at Al.
7 Id. There was a great deal of prejudice against women who sought to retain their own
names. For example, Hillary Rodham Clinton originally went by Hillary Rodham after she got
married, but then decided to take her husband's name after it became clear that it would be a
point of contention in the Arkansas gubernatorial elections. Christman, supra note 4. Even in
1985, Priscilla Ruth MacDougall reported that while writing her article entitled The Right of
Women to Name Their Children, one woman had rented a post office box so that she could ask the
author about the possibility of giving her child her surname instead of her husband's without
jeopardizing her marriage. See MacDougall, supra note 4, at 102 n.18.
Hyphenating the groom and bride's last name is another alternative, but it is very rare.
Less than one percent of women hyphenate names or use a combination of both names. Chris
Poon, The Name Game, PROVIDENCEJ.-BULL, Oct. 17, 1999, at 8L. Perhaps the reason hyphen-
ated names are so scarce is because they are generally harder to pronounce or go by. For ex-
ample, Holly Meyer for a while went by Holly Lodge Meyer, but she said it sounded like a "bad
Boy Scout camp." Christman, supra note 4.
Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz & Gloria Jeanne Stillson MacDonnell, Married Women's Surnames, 5
CONN. L. REV. 598, 599 (Summer 1972).
10 In some states the wife just signs her new married name, if she takes one, on the marriage
certificate, and that officially changes her name. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1501 (West
1996). Other states have specific places on the certificate where the wife can put her previous
surname and her new surname. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 14-a (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-03-20 (1997).
1 Because state and nationwide statistics of name changes are not really kept, anecdotal evi-
dence is all there really is. According to one article, Milwaukee County Clerk Mark Ryan, who
oversees marriage certificates, said the trend of a groom taking the bride's name is growing,
and it is something he has only seen recently beginning in the mid-1990s. Jessica McBride, More
Grooms Are Saying 'I Do' to Taking Bride's Last Name in the Name of Love, MILWAUKEEJ. SENINEI,
Nov. 28, 1999, Lifestyle, at 1. A search on Lexis for stories about husbands taking their wives'
names turned up four articles discussing the issue since 2000, while no articles were found from
1970 to 1990. Maya Blackmun, By Whatever Name, Bride Still Herself OREGONIAN, Jan. 17, 2002,
Southwest Zoner at 6; Husband Takes Wife's Name, DAYroN DAILY NEWS, Jan. 8, 2001, Local at 2B;
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Luckily in New York, where I was married, the statute has been
changed to read:
One or both parties to a marriage may elect to change the surname by
which he or she wishes to be known after the solemnization of the mar-
riage... [to] (i) the surname of the other spouse; or (ii) any former sur-
name of either spouse; or (iii) a name combining into a single surname
all or a segment of the premarriage surname or any former surname of
each spouse; or (iv) a combination name separated by a hyphen, pro-
vided that each part of such combination surname is the premarriage
surname, or any former surname, of each of the spouses."
Most grooms do not have such luck. In most states, men who want to
change their name upon marriage must go through the formal statu-
tory name change proceeding.' Although discussed in depth later
on, going through the regular name change proceeding is at the very
least, a hassle, and at the very most, an impossibility.
Although there is significant literature concerning the right of
women to retain their maiden names, the right of men to change
their names upon marriage has not really been addressed. Although
certainly analogous issues, they have slightly different implications
and analysis. In addition, most of the articles arguing for the
women's right were written in the early 1970s before the intermediate
scrutiny test was settled and thus would be written very differently to-
day. This Comment argues that the victories that women have won in
the marital name change battle have left men with rights that lag be-
hind. The following section addresses why this question is important
at all and argues that controlling one's naming practices is an im-
mensely important right. Then, after an examination of the current
name change upon marriage practices among the states, this Com-
ment refutes the traditional rationales for perpetuating the gender
bias inherent in these state statutes. The inequality in the current
statutes and the way in which they are administered is shown to be a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
and are thus unconstitutional. Additionally, after an examination of
the history of name change provisions and an analysis of current fun-
Jane Greig, Prince or Pauper, Fish or Fowl, Creek or Canyon Have at Least One, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, Mar. 25, 2000, Lifestyle, at DI (giving advice to newlyweds who choose alternative
surname schema); Lou Gonzales, Man Finds Resistance to Name Change, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Feb.
10, 2000, Lifestyle, at D2.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (West 1999). The practice commentary following this section
reads: "Some men, it should be noted, have, after marriage, elected to adopt the surname of
their spouses. These decisions are a matter of voluntary choice." Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice
Commentary: Options for Selecting Surname, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 15, C15:2 at 173 (West 1999).
1s As discussed in greater detail later on, a statutory name change proceeding entails paying
extra fees, publishing information about the name change in a local paper, waiting for up to
three months, and ultimately being at the mercy of a judge who may have absolute discretion.
See infra Part 11(c) (5) (examining de minimis injury in the equal protection context).
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damental right doctrine, this Comment argues, in Part III, that it
should be a fundamental right for both men and women to be able to
choose whether to change or retain their names upon marriage.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF NAMES
A common response among courts to those challenging name
change statutes has been that they are trivial challenges and not really
worth the court's time. For example, in the case of In re Kayaloff the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York re-
sponded briefly and succinctly to a woman who felt she had been
harmed by being forced to take her husband's name upon marriage:
"It is my judgment that [not one professional woman] has been dam-
aged professionally by the fact that, upon marriage, she took the sur-
name of her husband.' 14 This argument might seem even stronger
when we are dealing with a man's right to change his name. The
court in In re Kayaloff-albeit in 1934-was speaking of the practice of
forcing a woman to adopt her husband's name, while this Comment
is simply arguing against the practice of not allowing a man to adopt
his wife's name without extra hassle. It is a privilege denied rather
than an action forced. What the court did not realize, however, is the
extreme importance of this subject. Without much thought, it is a
subject easy to dismiss, but deeper investigation into the meaning of
names in our society reveals that control of one's name is anything
but trivial and immensely important.
One's name is a person's first possession in the world, and one
that a person lives with, in many cases, for the person's entire life.
Parents lagonize over what to name their children-as well they
should. No one calls such a parent's agony trivial, because it is
deemed very important by society. A person's name is what that per-
son is known by in society, and as the district court of Hawaii cor-
rectly observed, "[o]ne's name becomes a symbol for one's self.""!
Could one even imagine a democratic society where parents did not
have the right to name their own children? In fact, in Nazi Germany,
this was one of the first dehumanizing efforts of the Nazi regime: to
force Jewish males to take the name "Israel" and Jewish women to
take the name "Sarah" if their own name was not 'Jewish enough" so
14 In reKayaloff, 9 F. Stipp. 176, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
15 See, e.g., Melissa Fyfe, Monitoring Those Monikers, AGE (MELBOURNE), May 27, 1997, at I (de-
scribing parents' agony about children's name because of their realization that names are "usu-
ally a tag for life").
16 Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Haw. 1979) (finding that parents have the right
to give their child any surname they wished).
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that Nazis could readily identify them as Jews. 7 A name carries with it
our personal identity, familial and ethnic history, and encompasses
part of ourselves.
Names also have certain implications in how we relate to society.
There often exists the folklore that people with certain names exhibit
certain characteristics,18 but at least one psychological study has estab-
lished that society's conceptions of people's names directly affect
their interactions with that individual and their perceptions of that
individual. 9 In a recent psychology study, elementary teachers in the
United States were asked to rate children's performances in school,
and even though the children performed similarly, teachers rated
children with certain names as less able. '  Kif Augustine-Adams
summed it up best when she remarked that "[n]aming practices re-
flect conceptions of individuality, equality, family and community
that are fundamental to identity.""
Naming practices are not just important in the United States, but
the Court of Human Rights and the European Commission have also
recognized their extreme importance. Aeyal Gross, in her article re-
viewing recent international case law in naming practices, noted:
"Limits on the choice of one's own name are de facto limits on the
individual's zone of privacy.'"2  Gross' statement was based in part on
her examination of choice of name cases before the Court of Human
23Rights and the European Commission. Those cases are examined
under the privacy clause of Article 8 of the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states
17 The adopted middle name then had to be added to official documents, such as birth cer-
tificates, and used in all official communication upon threat of fine or imprisonment. Kif
Augustine-Adams, The Beginning of Wisdom Is To Call Things by Their Right Names, 7 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 1, 28-29 (Fall 1997) (quoting Robert M. Rennick, The Nazi Name Decrees of the
Nineteen Thirties, 18 NAMES 65, 76, 80 (1970)).
18 See, e.g., Naming or Shaming?, YORKSHIRE POST, Feb. 26, 2002 (discussing naming of chil-
dren and its significance and noting that girls who are named Sharon or Tracy are assumed of-
ten times to be "fluffy good-time girls").
19 Luisa Dillner, Parents: Remember, A Name Is for Life: It's One Thing To Call a Child Fifi
Trixibelle, Says Luisa Dillner. But Osama bin Laden?, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Nov. 7, 2001, Features,
at 9. This idea is almost common sense, though. As the poet Robert Frost said:
A name with meaning could bring up a child,
Taking the child out of the parents' hands.
Better a meaningless name, I should say,
As leaving more to nature and happy chance.
Name children some names and see what you do.
Robert Frost, NEW HAMPSHIRE (1923).
20 Dillner, supra note 19.
' Augustine-Adams, supra note 17, at 1.
2 Aeyal M. Gross, Note and Comment: Rights and Normalization: A Critical Study of Eurapean Hu-
man Rights Case Law on the Choice and Change of Names, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 269, 269 (Spring
1996).
23Id.
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that "everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life." 4 The international court apparently has decided that naming
issues are so personal that they implicate very important privacy is-
sues.
Being able to change one's name is also very important in society.
Among the Sikhs, in India and around the world, all women adopt
the surname Kaur and all men adopt the surname Singh to show a
renouncement of family lineage and to create a casteless society."
This is an important religious and cultural statement that would not
be possible without the unhindered freedom to change names. Us-
ing another famous example, Malcolm Little changed his last name
to Malcolm X to signify his conversion to the Nation of Islam and to
"obliterat[e] family, friends, culture, lineage, even ethnicity. To be X
is to be Muslim and nothing more., 26 There is also a contemporary
movement of African-Americans to change their birth names to Afri-
can names because it "connects them to their ancestry. 2 7 Such prac-
tices reflect the extreme significance one's name has in society.
These are but a few examples of the many cultural and religious im-
plications associated with naming practices. Names reach to our be-
lief systems, lineages, and the core of our identity.2s Being in control
of our own names is anything but trivial - it is an extremely important
right.
II. A SUMMARY OF CURRENT NAME CHANGE STATUTES
Currently, only seven of the fifty states have statutes that explicitly
give a man the right to change his name upon marriage. 9 There are
some states, no doubt, that do not grant an explicit statutory right,
24 European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
25 The male surname Singh meant lion and the female surname Kaur meant princess. A
Sikh prophet felt that giving all men and women one name would renounce family lineage and
occupation as determinants of social status. Augustine-Adams, supra note 17, at 27.
26 Id. at 28 (quoting JUSTrN KAPLAN & ANNE BERNAYS, THE LANGUAGE OF NAMES 87-88
(1997)).
27 See, Alliniece Taylor, A Nod to Africa, FLA. TIMES-UNION, May 1, 2000, at C1.
28 To take a passage from Lewis Carrol which exemplifies this idea of a name representing
ourselves to the community:
"Must a name mean something?" Alice asked doubtfully.
"Of course it must," Humpty Dumpty said with a short laugh: "my name means the shape
I am and a good handsome shape it is, too. With a name like yours, you might be any
shape, almost."
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 160 (Donald Gray
ed., Norton & Co. 1971) (1893).
These states are: Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, and North
Dakota. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-33.1 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 574-1 (Michie 1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 595.5 (West Supp. 2001); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 100 (West 2002); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 46, § ID (Law. Co-op. 1991); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 15 (McKinney 1999); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-03-20.1 (1996).
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but that will allow a man to change his name upon marriage never-
theless. For example, Wisconsin's marriage statutes do not mention
such a right, but clerks in Milwaukee County reportedly just pencil in
a modification to the marriage certificate and allow the man's name
change."' However, without explicit statutory authority, there is a
question whether such a name change would even be valid as these
changes have not been authorized by the state legislature. In addi-
tion, most states are not so generous and require a groom to go
through the formal statutory process of changing his name if he
wants to change his surname upon marriage: A woman, on the
other hand, has the right to either take her husband's surname or re-
tain her maiden name upon marriage in all fifty states."'
The same inequality can be seen with name change rights upon
divorce." Thirty-six states give women the statutory right to revert to
their pre-marriage name upon divorce. However, many of the states
do not contemplate the same problem for men, and thus do not give
them the same rights. There is not much consistency in this area as
See McBride, supra note 11.
31 For example, Jeanne Conner, customer service representative for the Laramie County
marriage license department, refers grooms who want to change their name upon marriage to
the clerk of the district court in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Karen Jansen, Play the Name-Change Game,
WAYOMINGTRIBUNE-EAGLE,Jtne 4, 2000, High Plains Living.
.12 See MacDougall, supra note 4.
31 Name change statutes upon annulment usually parallel or are contained in the name
change statutes upon divorce and do not need to be treated separately. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240-a (McKinney 1999) ("In any action or proceeding brought tinder the provisions of this
chapter wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce or annulment of a marriage ... each
party may resume the use of his or her pre-marriage surname or any other former surname.").
"M These states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.165 (Michie 2000);
ARIZ. RIN. STAT. ANN. § 25-325 (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-318 (Michie 2000); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 2080 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-63 (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1514 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. §19-3-33.1(1999); HAW. REA STAT. ANN. § 574-5(B) (Mi-
chie 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-15-2-18 (West 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 674.13 (West 1996);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(c) (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.230 (Michie 1999); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1051 (West 1998); MD. CODEANN., FAM. LAW§ 7-105 (1999); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 208, § 23 (Law. Co-op. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.391 (Michie 1988);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.27 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-108(4) (2001); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-380 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 125.130(4) (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:24 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-21 (West 2000); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240-a (McKin-
ney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-12 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.16 (Anderson 2000);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 121 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1983); 54 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 704 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-17 (2(100); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-180
(Law. Co-op. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-47 (Michie 1999); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.706
(Vernon 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 558 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-121.4 (Michie 2000);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.150 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-613 (Michie 2001);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.20 (West 2001).
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even Massachusetts, one of the five states that gives a statutory right to
men to change their name upon marriage, still only allows women to
change their name back upon divorce without going through the
formal statutory name change procedure: s5 In fact, thirteen of the
thirty-six states granting women the statutory right to revert to their
pre-marriage names explicitly limit this right to women. In addi-
tion, some states have just recently changed their statutes to make
them more gender neutral.' As these numbers show, thirty-two per-
cent of states with name change upon divorce provisions give that
statutory right exclusively to women.
As this Comment later notes, an obvious response to a lack of
name change rights upon marriage or divorce is that there always ex-
ists a formalized statutory procedure to change one's name that ei-
ther spouse can use." While the validity of that argument will be ana-
lyzed later, one of the counterarguments presented is that statutory
name change provisions are not as easy to obtain as the courts sug-
gest. Therefore, it is helpful to understand how strict most state stat-
utes are in granting general name change requests before looking at
this argument. Using phrases such as "what a court shall deem right
and proper," six of the fifty states give total discretion to the courts to' 9
decide whether to grant a name change. With basically no stan-
dards, petitioners are at the mercy of whatever state judge they may
receive. An additional eleven states give almost total discretion to the
courts, applying vague standards such as "if not against the public in-
35 MASs. ANN. tAWS ch. 208, § 23 (Law. Co-op. 1991) ("The court in granting a divorce may
allow a woman to resume her maiden name .... ) (emphasis added).
These states are Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont. ARK CODE
ANN. § 9-12-318 (Michie 2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2080 (West 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-15-2-
18 (West 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.230 (Michie 1999); LA CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art.
3947 (West 2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 23 (Law. Co-op. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 552.391 (Michie 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-108(4) (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 125.130(4) (Michie 1996); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 121 (West 2001); R.I. GE.N. LAWS § 15-5-
17 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-47 (Michie 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 558 (2001).
37 For example, New Hampshire just made its statutes gender neutral in 1996, thus giving
men the same right to revert to their pre-marriage name. 1996 N.H. ALS 32. South Carolina
made the change in 2000. S.C. CODEANN. § 20-3-180 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000).
Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222 (M.D. Ala. 1971) ("In balancing these interests,
this Court notes that the State of Alabama has afforded a simple, inexpensive means by which
any person, and this includes married women, can on application to a probate court change his
or her name.").
These states are: Idaho, Montana, South Carolina, Washington, Connecticut, and Geor-
gia. IDAHO CODE § 7-804 (Michie 2001); MONT. CODEANN. § 27-31-204 (2001); S.C. CODEANN.
§ 15-49-20 (Law. Co-op. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.130 (West 1997); Don v. Don, 114
A.2d 203, 205 (Conn. 1955) (permitting a child's name to be changed to that of the adopted
parent despite objections from the biological parent); In re Mullinix, 262 S.E.2d 540, 541 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1979) (overturning the trial court's denial of a name change).
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terest ''40 or "for good reasons shown.",4' Thus, there exists virtually un-
fettered judicial discretion with respect to name changes in a total of
seventeen states.
Even in the remaining thirty-three states, most courts have gone
beyond the restrictions listed in the statutes and rejected name
change applications due to public policy or just their own whim. For
example, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied the petition of a man
who wished to change his name to "1069" for no other reason than
the court did not think such a name conformed with their ideal of
social norms.42 With so much discretion given to, and sometimes
taken by, the courts, there is no assurance that any application will
necessarily be approved. It might be argued that many judges would
automatically allow name changes for marital purposes. However, a
groom taking his wife's name is not a widely accepted practice, and
judges have denied applications where they did not think it fit certain
social structures. For instance, some courts have denied gay couples'
petitions to have the same last name.43 This example is not so impor-
tant because it directly applies to marital name change statutes, but
because it shows that giving discretion to courts means that they are
free to apply the social norms that they find acceptable. Forcing
grooms to put up with the whims of the state courts is certainly not
treating them equally to women in changing their name upon mar-
riage when all that women have to do to change their name is to fill
40 Alaska, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Texas only instruct the judge that the name change
should not be granted if against the public interest. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.165 (Michie 2000);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 33.410 (1983); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 45.103 (Vernon 1998).
41 The statutes of Arkansas, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, and
South Dakota say that the petitioner must present a "good reason" for a name change. ARK.
CODEANN. § 9-2-101 (Michie 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25.21,271 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. 41.290
(1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 101-2 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-28-02 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2717.01 (Anderson 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-37-5 (Michie 1999).
42 In re Dengler, 287 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Minn. 1979). In a similar case, the California Appel-
late Court refused to allow a man to change his name to "Ill." In re Ritchie, 159 Cal. App. 3d
1070, 1072 (1984). Courts have also routinely disallowed name changes for people trying to
mask their ethnic identity or for those who merely wish to change their name to one that is
more easily pronounced. SeeJane M. Draper, Annotation, Circumstances Justifying Grant or Denial
of Petition To Change Adult's Name, 79 A.L.R.3d 562 (1977).
43 See In re Bicknell, No. CA2000-07-140, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 650 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12,
2001) (holding that allowing a gay woman to adopt her partner's surname would go against
public policy and would be sanctioning their lifestyle); see also In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579,
581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that permitting a name change for a same-sex
couple was against public policy). However, at least one judge in New Jersey has put "public
policy" aside in granting the name change of a transsexual. In re Eck, 584 A.2d 859, 861 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991):
[W]e perceive that the [lower court) judge was concerned about a male assuming a fe-
male identity in mannerism and dress. That is an accomplished fact in this case, a matter
which is of no concern to thejudiciary, and which has no bearing upon the outcome of a
simple name change application.
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out a marriage certificate. And lest one think a judge would always
approve a man's wish to adopt his wife's surname, at least one Florida
judge was resistant to this idea when he told Dan Cipoletti that he
"needed a better reason than getting married to change his name.44
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUES IN MARITAL NAME CHANGE STATUTES
A. Standard of Review
Two separate equal protection issues are applicable here, al-
though both are analyzed under the same standard of review. Proba-
bly due to the widespread custom of having the wife take the hus-
band's name, not one state statute specifies that the wife takes the
husband's name upon marriage. 45 Certainly, though, it is the custom
that a wife take her husband's surname upon marriage, and all fifty
states give the wife that option.46  The question presented in this
Comment, however, is not whether it is unconstitutional to require
the wife to take her husband's name-all fifty states have addressed
that issue, and now a woman has the right to retain her maiden name
in the United States. The question at issue here is whether it is un-
constitutional to allow the wife to change her name upon marriage,
but not to allow a husband to change his name by the same process.
Thus, the first proposed equal protection challenge would be raised
in those states that give the option for a woman to change her name
to her husband's surname upon marriage, but do not afford that
same opportunity to the husband.4
The second proposed equal protection challenge relates to the
name change statutes upon divorce. Because most of the marriage
statutes do not mention the name change issue at all, they are not
themselves facially discriminatory. However, those statutes that cover
name change upon divorce are facially discriminatory. Upon divorce,
many states allow a wife to legally change her name to her pre-
marriage name, but do not afford the same opportunity to men.49
44 Gonzales, supra note 11. It is unclear from the article whether the name change was ulti-
mately granted, but regardless, this demonstrates the whims of judges and their discretion over
name changes.
45 See MacDougall, supra note 4.
4 Id.
47 By statute, caselaw, or attorney general opinion, all fifty states allow a wife to retain her
name upon marriage, and thus she has a choice whether to change her name to the husband's
surname or retain her maiden name. Id.
48 For a list of these states, see supra note 34.
49 See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. 125.130(4) (Michie Supp. 2001) ("[I]f a divorce is granted,
the court may, for just and reasonable cause and by an appropriate order embodied in its de-
cree, change the name of the wife to any former name which she has legally borne.") (emphasis
added).
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Both equal protection challenges deal with practically the same issue:
the right to change one's surname upon a change in one's marital
status. The difference is one between facially discriminatory statutes
for divorce and facially neutral statutes for marriage that are carried
out in a discriminatory manner.
Whether facially discriminatory or effectively discriminatory, each
of these cases can be considered with the same level of scrutiny. Craig
v. Boren firmly introduced the intermediate scrutiny test for equal
protection challenges to gender discrimination cases. ° Under the in-
termediate scrutiny test, "classifications by gender must serve impor-
tant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. ,5' The Court has said that it does
not matter if the discriminatory laws disadvantage men rather than
women because any gender classification, whether disadvantaging
men or women, must meet the intermediate scrutiny standard.5 The
same standard of review is also applied if, as in the name change
upon marriage case, the statutes themselves are facially neutral, but
they are administered in a discriminatory way.53 This is not analogous
to disparate impact analyses which hold that facially neutral laws
which have disparate impacts only receive heightened review if moti-
vated by a discriminatory purpose. If a statute is neutral, but men
are being denied the opportunity to change their name upon mar-
riage, there is no question that the statute is being administered in a
50 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (holding an Oklahoma statute to be unconstitu-
tional which allowed women to purchase 3.2% beer at a younger age than men as a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause).
5 Id. at 197.
52 Craig v. Boren itself was a challenge to a statute which discriminated against men rather
than women. Justice Rehnquist found this troubling in his dissent, but later cases reinforced
that discrimination against both men and women is treated with the same level of scrutiny. Id.
at 217 (RehnquistJ., dissenting) ("First is [the Court's] conclusion that men challenging a gen-
der-based statute which treats them less favorably than women may invoke a more stringent
standard of judicial review .... Most obviously unavailable to support any kind of special scru-
tiny in this case, is a history or pattern of past discrimination .... "); cf Michael M. v. Sonoma
County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981) (analyzing a statute which makes men alone crimi-
nally liable for statutory rape under intermediate scrutiny); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
210-211 (1977) (invoking intermediate scrutiny to analyze a statute which automatically paid
survivor benefits to widows, but only paid them to widowers if he was receiving at least one-half
of his support from his deceased wife).
53 The argument that the text was facially neutral has failed under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when the statute plainly has a discriminatory effect or it is administered in a discrimina-
tory fashion. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1967) ("The mere fact of equal application
does not mean that our analysis of these statues should follow the approach we have taken in
cases involving no racial discrimination .... There can be no question but that Virginia's mis-
cegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race.").
M See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that disparate impact
alone was not enough evidence of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but that there also
must be an "invidious discriminatory purpose" which may be inferred in some cases from the
facts, but not always so).
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discriminatory manner, not just with a discriminatory effect, and thus
intermediate scrutiny applies.
B. Former Equal Protection Challenges to Name
Change upon Marriage Statutes
There is no case directly on point that challenges either the name
change upon divorce or name change upon marriage statutes as be-
ing discriminatory towards men for not giving them the choice to
change their name. This is primarily due to the fact that the practice
of men changin5 their name upon marriage is both recent and still
hardly practiced. There are, however, similar cases in the federal
courts that would be highly analogous to such a challenge. Some of
these cases focus upon the right of a woman to retain her name upon
marriage, and others concern the right of a child to bear a surname
other than his or her father's name. There may be some cosmetic
differences in the treatment of these cases, but the general equal pro-
tection analysis is the same.
In the case of O'Brien v. Tilson, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina struck down a statute forcing a
child to bear his father's surname as an unlawful "classification based
on gender."5 The parents wished to name their son in accordance
with the Swedish custom of combining the father's given name, Arne,
with the suffix, son, to make Arneson, but the North Carolina statute
mandated that the child's surname be the same as the father' S.57 The
court did not even reach the question of the standard of review, as it
found that, "[t]he [c]ourt need not decide whether the state must
show a compelling state interest or some lesser interest ... because
even under the most relaxed of standards ... the statute proves to be
patently defective."'' The State argued that it would complicate rec-
ord keeping of newborns and also create difficulties in keeping accu-
rate health records to allow the child to bear a different name from
the father, but the court sharply responded: "In this age of electronic
data processing, the Court cannot conclude that permitting plaintiffs
to do as they wish would render it impossible or even minimally more
costly or difficult for the State of North Carolina to keep track of its
new citizens."5 9 The State basically seemed to be arguing that their
records were set up according to the long-standing tradition of the
. See McBride, supra note 11.
O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
57 Id. at 495.
Id. at 496.
I ld. at 497. Furthermore, the district court noted that how the state keeps records is their
own business, and the State is free to file the birth certificate under the father's surname and
call the children "Huey, Duey, and Louey, or however [the State] sees fit." Id.
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child bearing the father's surname, but the court clearly did not
think that the extra hassle of having to rearrange state records would
survive even a rational basis review. Although the court did not reach
the issue of the appropriate standard of scrutiny, presumably, since
the statute was facially discriminatory, the court would have used an
intermediate standard of review had the State proffered a more com-
pelling interest than mere administrative convenience.
6
0
In Forbush v. Wallace, the United States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Alabama rejected an equal protection challenge to a
statute that required a wife to take her husband's surname upon mar-
riage.6' First of note in this opinion is the fact that the court used a
rational basis review as if no heightened scrutiny was warranted."
Craig v. Boren, which solidified the use of the intermediate scrutiny
test, had not yet been decided, and the standard to apply to gender
classifications was very much up in the air in 1972. The Court in 1971
had applied rational basis review to a gender classification in Reed v.
Reed, and then in 1973, Justice Brennan, writing for only a plurality of
the Court, applied strict scrutiny to a gender classification in Frontiero
v. Richardson. It is not surprising then that the Forbush court applied
a rational basis review and that the Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion without an opinion."' The Supreme Court itself could not de-
cide on a standard of review for gender discrimination. A number of
the Justices on the Court may not have wanted to articulate a stan-
dard, thinking that the Equal Rights Amendment," which in 1973 was
pending ratification by the states, but which never passed, would re-
6 Mere administrative convenience certainly does not meet an intermediate standard of
review. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) ("Decisions following Reed similarly have
rejected administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important objectives to justify gen-
der based classifications.").
fi Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Snpp. 217, 222-23 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (per curiam), affd without
opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
62 Id. at 222 ("This judicial pronouncement, as with any state statute or regulation, must
have a rational basis.").
R3 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (invalidating a law which allowed
male servicemen to claim their wife as a dependent, but requiring female servicewomen to
demonstrate that their spouse was in fact dependent upon her for at least one-half of his sup-
port); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)(holding invalid an Idaho statute which provided
that when two people were of the same entitlement class to administer an estate of a decedent
who died intestate, that preference should be given to the male).
64 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 683. Interestingly enough, in response to the Supreme Court affirm-
ing Forbush without an opinion, a young feminist attorney by the name of Ruth Bader Ginsburg
said, "[i]n American Civil Liberties Union women's rights litigation, we are attempting to limit
the potential harm by urging that a Supreme Court per curiam affirmance without opinion has
scant, if any, precedental value." 2 WOMEN TODAY, No. 8, Apr. 17, 1972. It would seem at least
one Justice on the Court might be sympathetic to this argument.
f For a discussion of the Equal Rights Amendment and the effects it would have had, See
Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
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solve the issue.6 Clearly, however, under the Craig v. Boren standard
of review, which has been reaffirmed by subsequent cases, this statute
should have been analyzed using the intermediate 
scrutiny test.6 7
Regardless of the standard used, however, Forbush is still very in-
formative in understanding the state interests that did pass a rational
basis review. The court noted that among the state interests were
uniformity among the several states and administrative convenience."
In addition, the court said that the injury was de minimis because
Alabama had a "simple, inexpensive means by which any per-
son ... can on application to a probate court change his or her
name. ' 69 This referred to the general statutory name change proce-
dure. It is also of note that the court found that the statute requiring
a woman to bear her husband's surname upon marriage was a con-
tinuation of English common law.70
As previously mentioned,' all fifty states now recognize the right
of a woman to retain her maiden name, and Forbush was overturned
by the Alabama Supreme Court in its 1982 decision in 
State v. Taylor.2
In State v. Taylor, the Alabama statute that required women to register
to vote in their husband's surnames was challenged.7" Interestingly
enough, the Alabama Supreme Court did not re-evaluate the equal
protection analysis of Forbush, but addressed whether the wife taking
her husband's surname was really the common law of Alabama as de-
scended from English common law.74 The court eventually held that
it was not.75 This effectively sidestepped the gender issue that Forbush
presented. Thus, even though Forbush was overturned on other
grounds, it continues to stand in that jurisdiction for the proposition
that such name change upon marriage statutes should be held up to
a rational basis of review.
See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (1973) (Powell,J., concurring) ("There is another, and I find
compelling, reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the
strictest test ofjudicial scrutiny. The Equal Rights Amendment... will resolve the substance of
this precise question ....").67. . .
See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (applying inter-
mediate scrutiny in the analysis of a female only entrance policy); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199, 210-11 (1977) (invoking intermediate scrutiny to analyze a statute which automatically paid
survivor benefits to widows, but only paid them to widowers if he was receiving at least one-half
of his support from his deceased wife).
Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 218, 222 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
Id. at 222 (internal citation omitted).
70 Id.
71 See MacDougall, supra note 4.
72 State v. Taylor, 415 So.2d 1043 (Ala. 1982).
73 Id. at 1043.
74 Id. at 1047.
75 Id. ("Our research has convinced us that Forbush v. Wallace does not accurately state the
common law on names .... ).
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Other evidence -tends to show that Congress supports the right to
control one's name upon marriage. In 1964, Congress passed Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, which holds that it is unlawful for an em-
ployer to discriminate against any individual with respect to their
sex.7 , The Sixth Circuit has applied this statute to marital name
change. In Allen v. Lovejoy, the court invoked Title VII when a woman
was fired from her job because she refused to go by her husband's
surname after marriage and wanted to sign her own maiden name to
company forms. 77 The Sixth Circuit stated that a "rule which applies
only to women, with no counterpart applicable to men, may not be
the basis for depriving a female employee who is otherwise qualified
of her right to continued employment."78 In addition to Title VII,
Congress has added a section to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
that is specifically gender neutral and states: "A creditor shall not ref-
use to allow an applicant to open or maintain an account in a birth-
given first name and a surname that is the applicant's birth-given
surname, the spouse's surname, or a combined surname." Clearly,
considering the Sixth Circuit's construction of Congress' intent in
enacting Title VII and the additions Congress has made in the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, Congress feels it important that a spouse
who wishes to either change their name upon marriage or keep it the
same not be discriminated against. While Congress has not specifi-
cally addressed the issue of a man changing his name upon marriage,
it is more likely that this is due to the practice being relatively infre-
quent rather than it not falling in line with their aforementioned
policies.
C. Equal Protection Analysis in Not Allowing Men
To Change Their Name Upon Marriage or Divorce
Using the above cases as a guide, if the constitutionality of the
aforementioned statutes were challenged, it is very unlikely that any
of the aforementioned state interests would survive the now required
intermediate scrutiny level of review. Omi Morgenstern Leissner di-
vides the Forbush justifications into four categories: "1) custom; 2)
administrative convenience; 3) prevention of fraud; and 4) de mini-
mis injury."0 She goes on to list another justification which usually
falls in the custom category, "preservation of the family unit. 8. Un-
der the intermediate scrutiny test, these five interests would have to
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
77 Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977).
78 Id. at 524.
79 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (2001).
80 See Leissner, supra note 2, at 262.
81 , 
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serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related
to those objectives to survive intermediate scrutiny 2  Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent in Craig v. Boren rightly asked: "How is this
Court to divine what objectives are important? How is it to determine
whether a particular law is 'substantially' related to the achievement
of such objective . . . ?,,83 However, since the statutes in question do
not even pass rational basis review, it is unecessary to even consider
the question of what objectives are important when looking at the
claimed state interest.
1. Custom
The idea that custom should control an issue completely ignores
the idea that our social values can ever evolve." If custom could con-
trol an equal protection issue, then interracial marriages would have
never been allowed in Loving v. Virginia,B and, according to their cus-
tom, no one but white jurors would have ever served in the state of
West Virginia. s6 Omi Morgenstern Leissner rightfully argued that
"[t]o subject different groups to disparate treatment because society
historically has done so undermines the very purpose of equal protec-
tion."' Custom may raise some administrative convenience questions
as changing current structures will cost time and money, but the ar-
gument that custom controls for its own sake is meritless.
2. Preservation of the Family Unit
It is also easy to dispense with preservation of the family unit as a
justification for male name change practices. As Leissner notes, this
rationale was based on the fact that children with different names
than their mother would be assumed illegitimate and would carry
that stigma with them.88 In contemporary society, this argument car-
ries little, if any, weight. First, even if society was structurally the same
as in earlier decades, giving a man the right to adopt his wife's name
would not present any illegitimacy problems. The mother and child
would, in fact, have the same name-as would the husband and wife.
Most importantly, though, society has changed, and today it is not all
82 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
83 Id. at 221.
84 See Leissner, supra note 2, at 263 (explaining that the use of custom to determine whether
a practice is justifiable rejects the notion of evolving social values).
85 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967)(holding that Virginia's scheme which prevent mar-
riages based on racial classifications was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that only allowing white jurors was
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
87 Leissner, supra note 2, at 263.
88 Id. at 265.
Oct. 20021
JOURNAL OF CONSTUVTIONAL LAW
that uncommon for a child to have a different last name than his or
her mother."" Upon considering the effect of women being able to
retain their names upon marriage, Charlotte Perkins Gilman wrote:
"As to illegitimate children, the term will disappear from the lan-
guage .... When women have names of their own, names not oblit-
erated by marriage ... there will be no way of labeling a child at
once, as legitimate or otherwise." ' Given the changes made in soci-
ety since preservation of the family unit was given as a state interest in
these case, there is really no viable argument that this would pass as
an important state interest. A child having a different last name than
his or her mother no longer indicates any status of illegitimacy if in-
deed that word even has much effect anymore, and certainly would
not survive intermediate scrutiny.
3. Administrative Convenience
Additionally, mere administrative convenience cannot withstand
intermediate scrutiny.9l In fact administrative convenience did not
even withstand rational basis review in the case of Jech v. Burch where
the district court struck down a statute requiring a newborn child to
have either the father's last name, the mother's last name, or a hy-
phenated combination of both. 92 The parents in Jech wanted their
child to bear the name 'Jebef," a combination of Jech, the mother's
last name, and Befurt, the father's last name.3 The State argued that
it would have to change its entire record keeping system to accom-
modate the parents. 'A As the court explained, though, this is hardly a
valid reason for the discriminatory conduct.9 ' First and foremost, in-
dexing the child's name under 'Jebef" instead of a hyphenated name
or one of the parent's last names hardly takes much additional work.
In fact, after lengthy arguments, the court was bewildered that "[f] or
reasons which have still not been explained satisfactorily to me, the
8 Justice Wilson, in a recent English family court case, noted: "In these days of such fre-
quent divorce and remarriage and such frequent cohabitation and indeed the preservation of
different surnames even within marriage, there was no opprobrium nowadays for a child to
have a different surname from that of the adults in the household." Children's Wishes on Name
Thwarted, TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 1, 1995, Features.
W MacDougall, supra note 4, at 152 (quoting Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Illegitimate Children, 4
FORERUNNER 295, 297 (1913)).
See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Haw. 1979).
93 Id. at 715.
94 The State argued that changing their system would "involve the expenditure of substantial
public funds." Id. at 720.
.5 It is of note that the district court in Jeh v. Burch did not address the equal protection ar-
gument at all, but rooted the problem in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment right. However,
the state interest rationale is still applicable. See id. at 719.
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department [of Health] is completely defeated by the problem of in-
dexing a child's surname such as 'Jebef,' which does not belong to
either of the parents."9 It is possible that limiting the last name as
the State wished would more easily identify the child's lineage, but
this argument does not hold much water. First, there are certainly
children and adults with the same last name who are not related and
thus being able to trace lineage in this manner would only be mar-
ginally useful. Second, if records of lineage were kept, it would be
just as easy to put different surnames for the parents in the child's re-
cord as it is to put the same surname. In addition, in today's techno-
logical age, this argument loses even more weight as computerized
records can easily be changed and modified without significant effort.
In fact, the court dismissed as simply "ludicrous" the idea that it
would be too difficult to keep the records in this manner."
By the same token, the argument that it would be administratively
inconvenient to allow men to change their surnames upon marriage
or divorce is also lacking. First and foremost is the fact that states are
already set up to easily change the names of women upon marriage
or divorce. Unless states have different databases based on the gen-
der of their citizens, allowing men to change their names would be as
simple as inputting the same information currently entered for
women. Also, any argument that it is necessary to have certain sur-
name conventions due to the need to trace lineage is refuted by the
same argument articulated by the Jech court. The only real increased
cost might have to do with updating certain forms that ask women for
their maiden name to make the forms more generic.98 Even then, it
would be as simple as telling a husband who changed his name upon
marriage to write it in the maiden name box. In short, it is certainly
doubtful whether any administrative convenience argument could
withstand even rational basis scrutiny, let alone intermediate scrutiny.
4. Fraud
The prevention of fraud is another state interest used to justify
these restrictions. The Eighth Circuit, in Henne v. Wright, another
right to name your child case, held that prevention of fraud was in-
%" Id. at 718.
97 Id. at 720 ("The State argues that it is necessary to name and register children as presently
done in order to trace relationships for purposes of determining devolution of property and
title to lands. There may have been a day when this argument had some validity. Today it is
ludicrous.").
98 Interestingly enough, there is no real equivalent word for "maiden name" for men. The
best that people have come up with is the hard-to-say "birth surname." McBride, supra note 11.
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deed a legitimate state interest.9 We must then move to the econd
prong of the intermediate scrutiny test and ask if the restriction is
substantially related to meet that objective. It is almost certain that
allowing unfettered name changes would cause substantial fraud. In
fact, lack of fraudulent intent is a requirement for a general name
change petition in all states.'0 Of note among the state statutes, and
ultimately a response to this state interest, is the text of Tennessee's
general name change statute: "persons who have been convicted of
the following offenses shall not have the right to legally change their
names: (A) First or second degree murder; or (B) Any offense, the
commission of which requires a sexual offender to register ....
Allowing convicted murderers or sex offenders who have recently
been released to easily change their names could promote fraudulent
or unlawful conduct. Tennessee, concerned about potential fraud
enough to create a special statute that deals with it, allows even felons
to change their name upon marriage, though.1°2 Evidently, when
marriage is the vehicle, Tennessee does not believe fraudulent name
changes would be a problem. This comes down to the simple reason-
ing that most people will not get married just so that they can change
their name and hide their identity.0 Assuming that the defrauder
could find someone willing to participate in a "sham" marriage just to
effect a name change, the defrauder would be limited to changing his
or her name to the person to whom he or she was getting married.
Furthermore, that person would then have to get out of the marriage,
which is easier said than done in many states, requiring extra cost,
time, and hassle. Finally, the defrauder could not already be mar-
ried. Thus, effecting a name change in this manner would only be
n ) Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that a child's surname
could fraudulently indicate paternity where none exists). In fact, the prevention of any crime is
an important governmental objective. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976)
("Clearly, the protection of public health and safety represents an important function of state
and local governments.").
IM See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 547:3-i (Supp. 2002); In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 693 (Me.
1975) (interpreting the Maine general name change statute as requiring a lack of fraud); In re
Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857 (Ind. 1974) (stating that the onlyjob of the Indiana courts with regard
to name change is to make sure there is no fraudulent attempt).
101 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-8-101 (b) (2000).
Id.
101 Sham marriages are much more of a concern in the immigration context than in the
name change context. INS Charges Travel Agencies with Setting Up Fake Marriages, THE RECORD
(BERGEN CO., NJ) Aug. 19, 1999, News, at 2 Star B. The fact is that there are better ways to get
an official name change than by marriage, and entering into a fraudulent marriage is a felony
in some states. Dan Herbeck, Alien Going from Sham Wedlock to Lockup, BUFFALO NEWS, May 2,
1996, at IA (sentencing a man to four months in prison, five hundred dollars in fines, and put-
ting a felony on his record). It is unlikely that someone would risk being convicted of a felony
to effectuate a name change rather than go through the hassle of the formal name change pro-
cedure.
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available to those that were single. Given all these factors, it is easy to
see why Tennessee does not beleive fraudulent name changes upon
marriage are problematic and also why the state interest of prevent-
ing fraud is not very pressing.
Even if we were to dismiss the above, though, we come back to the
argument that women already have such a right. If the states were so
concerned with fraudulent abuse of name change upon marriage,
then curtailing a man's right to change his name upon marriage or
divorce would not be substantially related to meet that objective. If
this were an important state objective, then the state should place re-
strictions on both men and women with regard to name change upon
marriage and divorce-not only men. Therefore, due to the unlike-
lihood of fraudulent abuse combined with the fact that women, but
not men, are already permitted to change their name upon marriage
and divorce, it can hardly be argued that not giving men this choice is
substantially related to meet the objective of preventing fraud.
5. De Minimis Injury
Finally, we come to the argument that the injury in such a case is
de minimis. This argument can be divided into three separate argu-
ments: 1) there is in fact no injury in not allowing a man to take his
wife's name; 2) the common law already affords a man an easy way to
change a his last name to his wife's name; and 3) general narre
change statutes already allow a man to change his last name to his
wife's surname.
Given the importance of names in our society, it is hard to see
how to substantiate the reasoning that there is no injury in not allow-
ing a man to change his name upon marriage." This argument mir-
rors the exact idea already discussed in the case of In re Kayaloffwhere
the court told a woman in 1934 that there was no harm in not allow-
ing her to retain her professional name when she got married."15 As
Part I showed, a name is a symbol for one's self that carries with it
personal identity, familial ties, and ethnic history. Our names have a
substantial effect on how society perceives us. In fact, the specific de-
cision regarding choice of surnames upon marriage often carries with
it connotations in society.' ° Furthermore, putting restrictions on
104 See discussion supra Introduction.
105 In reKayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
1{ In a 1993 study, it was determined that sixty-eight percent of males and almost eighty-five
percent of females thought it was more acceptable for a woman to retain her own name if she is
a professional, indicating that women who do keep their surname will be often times lumped
into that category. Laurie Scheuble & David R. Johnson, Marital Name Change: Plans and Atti-
tudes of College Students, 55 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. 747, 750 (1993). Conversely, many in society
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changing one's name can interfere with important religious practices,
ethnic customs, and assertions of identity. It is evident that names
are not merely trivial, and that denying people the right to change
their names is much more than a "de minimis" injury.1 08
Still, it is true that in almost all fifty states, people possess the right
to change their names by common law just by beginning to use an-
other name. l  Therefore, upon marriage, if a man simply just starts
using his wife's last name, without any official documents at all, then
by common law it becomes his name. At least one state has made
statutory name change procedures exclusive, and for this state, this
argument has absolutely no applicability. "0 For the majority of states,
this common law right would seemingly end the inquiry as a de
minimis injury. However, the fact is that in contemporary society, the
common law right to change one's name is practically meaningless.
The realities of contemporary society requires a state-sponsored cor-
roboration to establish our identity. In advising a bride or groom on
changing one of their names upon marriage, Karen Jansen, of the
Wyoming Eagle-Tribune, notes that "a wife or groom who changes their
name must have official documentation to change their social secu-
rity card for tax purposes, to change their driver's license, and usually
to change their credit cards, just to name a few.""' It is doubtful
whether a credit card company will issue new cards to someone call-
ing up and declaring a common law name change. It is little comfort
or help to grooms who might want to change their last name that
they can call themselves whatever they want, if they will not be able to
obtain credit cards, bank accounts, mortgages, or many other necessi-
ties of today's life.
In addition, some states do not even recognize this supposed
common law right fully. These states have erected additional barriers
such that one must have additional documentation of a name change
will look down on men who adopt their wives' surname as thirty-three percent of college men
surveyed said it was never acceptable for a man to change his name to that of his spouse. Id.
107 See supra Part I (discussing Malcolm X and the Sikh practice of naming).
108 For a fuller discussion, see supra Introduction.
I W Almost all states provide that the statutory name change provision does not impede the
common law right to change one's name simply by using a new name. See, e.g., State v. Taylor,
415 So.2d 1043 (Ala. 1982); Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Traugott v.
Petit, 404 A.2d 77 (R.I. 1979). Contra Sneed v. Sneed, 585 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Okla. 1978) (hold-
ing that in Oklahoma, the statutory name change proceeding has replaced the common law
right).
110 See, e.g., Sneed, 585 P.2d at 1363 (holding that statutory name change is the exclusive
method of changing one's name in Oklahoma).
I SeeJansen, supra note 31. This really is just the tip of the iceberg. Banks and any other
financial institutions must have some concrete evidence of name change as well. Rebecca Sim-
mons, What's in a Name?, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Mar. 11, 1999, at B.
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even to interact with certain state agencies.Y2 The common law solu-
tion is not a serious answer to the inequity presented by male name
change upon marriage or divorce provisions. In 2000, the California
Attorney General acknowledged the inadequacy of the common law
right: "the inability to establish one's name for purposes of life's daily
transactions, although perhaps only occasionally resulting when sole
reliance is placed on the common law method, can be a substantial
inconvenience when it occurs."'". The California Attorney General
was being generous when he called it an inconvenience. Not being
able to use a bank account or obtain a driver's license is much more
than an inconvenience in our society.
Satisfied that the presence of a common law right does not make
the injury de minimis, the Forbush court noted that states provide a
separate statutory method to change one's name, thus apparently
again ending our inquiry into the inequity of the name change upon
marriage and divorce provisions."4 Even the American Law Reporter
stated:
The statutory method, it should be borne in mind, has the advantage of
being speedy and definite, of providing a convenient record of the name
change which may be later resorted to, and of eliminating the necessity
of elaborate evidence where the name change is later sought to be
proven in court.
While this Comment does not dispute the advantages of having a
statutory name change rather than a common law name change, the
premise of the American Law Reporter is simply not true. As Marga-
ret Eve Spencer noted in her article that attacked the refusal of
courts to recognize a woman's right to retain her maiden name,
"[t]here are two basic flaws in this reasoning: First, the 'simple pro-
cedure' is not cheap; and second, in many states there are legal ob-
stacles to a married woman changing her name."" 6 In Tennessee, for
example, the name change procedure can cost as much as $150 just
for the court fees (much more if a lawyer is hired)."7 Additionally,
although some states are exceptions, many states do not allow the
112 The Attorney General of South Dakota advised all state agencies that it was up to their
general discretion whether or not to accept a name change without appropriate documenta-
tion. 65 Op. Att'y Gen. S.D. No. 77-31 (1977).
13 83 OP. ATT'Y. GEN. CAL. No. 00-205 (2000).
14 Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222 (M.D. Ala. 1971) ("This Court notes that the
State of Alabama has afforded a simple, inexpensive means by which any person, and this in-
cludes married women, can on application to a probate court change his or her name.") (cita-
tion omitted).
15 Ronald A. Case, Annotation, Right of Married Woman To Use Maiden Surname, 67 A.L.R.3d
1266, 1272 (1975).
116 Margaret Eve Spencer, A Woman's Right to Her Name, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV 665, 688 (1973).
17Jan Galleta, Hyphen-ation: There's More to Hyphenated Names Than Saying 'I Do,
CHATrANOOGA TIMES, Nov. 5, 2000, at El.
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name change procedure filing fees to be waived if the petitioner does
not have the money.'"8 In addition to the filing expense, many states
require publication in a newspaper for a period of time, creating yet
another expense and also arguably constituting an invasion of privacy
as the entire community will be advised of one's personal 
affairs.
Furthermore, the petitioner is often required to make public very
private information, such as if he or she has ever been convicted of a
crime or gone into bankruptcy. "" While this information is often
times a matter of public record, it is not always so. In addition, even
if it is a matter of public record, it is another matter to be forced to
advertise this information in newspapers through the publication re-
quirements of the name change provisions.
Besides being expensive and arguably an invasion of privacy, the
statutory name change proceedings are also not without restrictions.
In many states, whether to accept a name change is totally within the
discretion of the court, and it is not obvious that all courts would ac-
cept a man wanting to adopt his bride's surname.'' There are other
more specific restrictions as well. For example, in North Carolina, a
petitioner has to file with the court proof by at least two witnesses of
good character.' 2 Also, in some states, there are additional restric-
tions on changing one's name for felons and sex offenders."'
Thus, a man who wants to change his name upon marriage and
must use the general state statutory schemes for name changes will
not only incur a substantial expense, but must declare to the court
and the community in which he lives through publication, private de-
tails of his life including his financial situation and his reasons for
changing his name. Even after this, there is no assurance in many
states that his request will be granted as many state courts have wide
discretion and additional restrictions exist depending upon the
11 See MO. REV. STAT. § 527.280 (West 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-20.1 (1996); Robin-
son v. Clark, 632 N.E.2d 1393 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the court does not have to
waive the filing fee for an indigent petitioner); hi re Moser, 65 Pa. D. & C.2d 356 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pleas 1974). But see WASH. RE. CODEANN. § 36.18.022 (West 1997 & Supp. 2002) (stating that
the court can waive the filing fees if an affidavit is produced showing financial hardship).
119 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-37-4 (Michie 1999) (requiring publication for four
weeks in a legal newspaper in order to issue notice of a name change).
120 SeeCase, supra note 115, at 1273.
121 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.130 (West 1997) (stating that the court has full discre-
tion in whether to accept a name change). Other statutes require the petitioner to satisfy simi-
larly discretionary standards such as "reasonable cause." See supra Part II (discussing in depth
the standards for general name change petitions).
122 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 101-4 (1999).
123 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.27 (West Supp. 2001) (citing MINN. STAT. § 259.13 (West
2001)). Although some states specifically provide that felons can change their surnames if they
are getting married. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-8-101 (2000) (limiting the name change rights of
only those convicted of first or second degree murder or any defense requiring a sexual of-
fender to register).
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groom's specific circumstances. Considering that women do not
have to go through this ordeal, it is ludicrous to call this injury de
minimis. In Jech v. Burch, the district judge, upon facing a similar de
minimis argument when considering the right of parents to name
their child what they wanted at birth, as opposed to using the statu-
tory name change provisions later, remarked, "[w]hat is the state in-
terest in refusing to allow parents to give their child at birth a name
which they may immediately confer by way of change of name? I fail
to see any such interest. ' 1 4 Likewise, what is the interest of the state
in refusing to allow a groom to change his name upon marriage when
he can do so through statutory means, albeit with much more ex-
pense and hassle? Calling the injury de minimis should not be the
end of the inquiry. The statutory provisions involve time, money,
perhaps embarrassment, and do not always provide the relief sought.
If women have a right to change their names upon marriage and di-
vorce, a de minimis argument should not succeed in refusing that
right to men.
D. Conclusion of Equal Protection Analysis
None of the traditionally proffered reasons for denying name
changes to men seem to hold much weight under a rigorous equal
protection analysis. Preservation of the family unit and custom are
very weak arguments that would probably not even pass rational basis
review. As discussed above, administrative convenience is not a
strong enough state interest to overcome the intermediate level of
scrutiny. While the prevention of fraud is certainly a compelling state
interest, denying names changes exclusively to men upon marriage or
divorce is simply not substantialy related to it. Finally, the harm in
these cases is far from de minimis, as a person's name is one of the
person's most sacred possessions, and both common law and statu-
tory name change provisions are no substitute for the simple marital
name change options that women now have.
Throughout gender discrimination case law, the Court has often
focused its efforts on trying to eliminate "stereotyped distinctions be-
tween the sexes"'125 and "archaic and overbroad generalization [s]
. 
026
124 Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 720 (D. Haw. 1979).
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973) (noting that the United States has
had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination and that these classifications based on
sex are "inherently invidious").
126 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (characterizing Frontiero v. Richardson
as standing for the fact that gender classifications based on "archaic and overbroad generaliza-
tion[s]" are unconstitutional); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (arguing that
"archaic and overbroad generalizations" could not justify discrimination based on gender).
Likewise, when the discrimination is not based on mere generalizations or stereotypes, but real
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The current name change schema which exist in most states was put
into place when women were deemed inferior to men, and many
commentators have argued that it was solely an effort "to render
women socially and politically invisible" with the idea that "a woman
has practically no identity apart from her husband." ' It is a relic, left
over from this nation's "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimi-
nation."2 " The state legislatures and courts have recognized this and
finally given women the right to women to change or retain their
names upon marriage,1' but men must still deal with those pieces of
the old schema that remain. As currently executed and written the
name change upon marriage and divorce statutes treat men and
women differently-giving a right to women which men do not have.
They are therefore unconstitutional and should be declared invalid.
IV. MEN AND WOMEN SHOULD HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT To
CHANGE THEIR NAME UPON MARRIAGE
Thus far, this Comment has attacked name change upon marriage
and divorce practices in terms of gender discrimination. One way for
a state legislature to rectify this gender discrimination would be to
not allow men or women the right to change their name upon mar-
riage or divorce. This would effectively eradicate the different ways
men and women are treated with respect to name change upon mar-
riage and divorce. This Comment further argues that even if a state
legislature were to pass a statute that did this, the statute should still
be unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'i A
denial of the right to change one's name under reasonable circum-
stances is a denial of due process. A court has never recognized the
right to change one's name upon marriage as a fundamental right.
However, as shown below, it has been a right of our society since the
common law of England, and the statutory restrictions now placed on
that right should be disallowed unless they are narrowly tailored to
differences, the Court has upheld those statutes. See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct.,
450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) ("[Tlhis Court has consistently upheld statutes where the gender clas-
sification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances.").
127 Leisnner, supra note 2, at 350; see also Christman, supra note 4.
12 Frontiero, 411 U.S. 684 (discussing how "such discriination was rationalized by an attitude
of romantic paternalism which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a
cage").
12i See MacDougall, supra note 4.
M U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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achieve a compelling state interest-something to which denying the
right to change one's name upon marriage does not adhere."'
Under English common law, it was long held to be the right of
every person to change his or her name at will as long as he or she
did not have fraudulent intentions.'3" This right extended to both
men and women and did not depend at all on marital status. 3  Un-
der common law, fraudulent intent in this regard meant that the spe-
cific purpose of the name change was to conceal one's true identity.
Except for Louisiana, which inherited its laws mainly from French
civil law, ' all fifty states inherited this English common law right."
The statutory method of changing one's name has generally been
held to be an aid to the common law right and not in place thereof,
and almost all fifty states with few exceptions have held that the
common law right still exists.137 Judge Arnold, in his dissent in Henne
v. Wright, remarked that "[t]he early tradition.., did not restrict
one's own choice of a surname .... So far as the choice of one's own
name is concerned, then, it seems well established that the tradition,
still extant, is a complete absence of statutory prohibition."'"
As discussed above, the common law right is no longer sufficient
in today's society to achieve its original aim. In eighteenth century
England, people did not have to worry about driver's licenses, social
security cards, or bank applications. If the common law right is to
131 This Comment does not explore the right to change one's name as a violation of First
Amendment free speech. However, it has been argued by commentators that restricting the
freedom to change one's name is such an infringement. For example, Margaret Eve Spencer
has argued:
The married woman in modem America who wishes to retain her maiden name, or to
use the title Ms. instead of Mrs. is generally making, and is understood by most people to
be making, a statement that she rejects certain aspects of the traditional female role or
stereotype.
Spencer, supra note 116, at 684. Judge Arnold, in Henne v. Wright, remarked, "The question
could well be analyzed as a First Amendment issue. What I call myself or my child is an aspect
of speech. When the State says I cannot call my child what I want to call her, my freedom of
expression, both oral and written, is lessened." Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir.
1990) (Arnold, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This is an interesting slant on the
right to change one's name, but due to the tenuous nature of the argument, it is not dealt with
here in detail. For a more in-depth analysis, see Spencer, supra note 116.
132 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1999) ("The opportunity to make [the choice of
surname upon marriage] is supported by ancient common law principles."). See also MacDon-
gall, supra note 4, at 103 (reiterating that under common law people can use the surname they
chose "as long as they do not do so for a fraudulent purpose"). For an extended discussion of
the common law right, see id. at 102-10.
i11B Id. at 106.
134 Id. at 103.
135 Most commentators and courts contend that Louisiana follows French civil law. See id. at
102 n.19.
I'm Id. at 102-03.
137 Draper, supra note 42, 79 A.L.R.3d at 565.
138 Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1218 (8th Cir. 1990).
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have any meaning today, then the common law right must now be a
state recognized name change with appropriate documentation. In
our society, a change of name is meaningless unless it is accompanied
by proof that one's name has actually been changed.
Courts already seem to be in agreement that the right to choose
and change one's name is protected under the Due Process Clause.
In Jech v. Burch, the court, in examining whether parents have a right
to name their children, noted that "a proper interpretation of Anglo-
American political and legal history and precedent leads to the con-
clusion that parents have a common law right to give their child any
name they wish, and that the Fourteenth Amendment protects this
right from arbitrary state action."' There, the court applied a ra-
tional basis test to find that the parent's right was violated.'4 Simi-
larly in Henne v. Wright, the majority analyzed the state's restrictions
on the right of parents to name their child under a rational basis test,
holding that the right was not fundamental, but was protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 4' Both cases recognized the Four-
teenth Amendment protections, but did not recognize the right as
fundamental.
If, however, the right to name a child is at least somewhat pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment, it follows that the right to
change one's own name upon marriage should likewise be protected.
It would not make much sense for all of us to have the right to choose
our children's names, but lack the right to control our own names.
In fact, in his dissent in Henne, Judge Arnold assumes the right to
choose one's own name is very strongly protected, and tries to use
that fact to influence the degree of protection for choosing one's
child's name: "I take it the [c]ourt would not deny a citizen the right
to choose her own name, absent some compelling governmental in-
terest .... There is something sacred about a name. It is our own
business, not the government's." 42 Judge Arnold goes so far as to as-
sume that the right to choose one's own name is in fact fundamental,
as he indicates by invoking the compelling interest language. 1' No
other court has gone so far, but as discussed above courts have as-
sumed that this right is at least protected to some degree. The ques-
tion, then, is to what degree.
'% Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Haw. 1979).
140 Id. at 919-20.
141 Henne, 904 F.2d at 1213-15.
142 Id. at 1217 (Arnold,J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 1216. It is well established that only compelling state interests will stand against
fundamental rights. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental
rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified
only by a 'compelling state interest' ..... ) (citations omitted).
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The right to change one's name non-fraudulently falls both within
the general scope of the right to privacy, as described by the United
States Supreme Court, and also follows from other fundamental
rights which the Court has established. The importance of one's
name has already been emphasized-it represents our identity, line-
age, and ethnic heritage.' 4 Although Justice O'Connor was speaking
of abortion, her words in Planned Parenthood v. Casey seem to conjure
up this idea of fundamental rights encompassing the notion of con-
trol over one's own identity: "[a] t the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.' ' 45 Given the cultural, religious,
ethnic, and societal implications of one's name already discussed, be-
ing able to name oneself is defining oneself and should be included
among other similar fundamental rights.
The right to change one's name upon marriage also follows more
concretely from other fundamental rights. Most notably is the gen-
eral right to marry' 4 and the freedom from government intrusion
into the marital relationship. 4  These rights go hand in hand with
the right to change one's name upon marriage. In fact, Justice
Blackmun remarked that the right to marry, the right to use contra-
ception, and other such privacy rights could be grouped together and
described as a "freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life
respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the
education and upbringing of children.' 48  Certainly deciding what
names each spouse will take as a couple starts their lives together-
thereby defining their relationship in some ways-is one of the core
decisions that have to be made when a marriage occurs. It has been
argued, for example, that forcing a woman to take her husband's
surname upon marriage would be defining the entire marriage as an
unequal partnership. Denying marital name choice may also go
against marital norms in some cultures and beliefs, thus preventing
144 See id. at 1213-15 (discussing in detail the importance of one's name).
145 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
146 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia's statutory scheme preventing
marriages based on racial classifications was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). This
right has not been extended to marrying members of the same sex, but that is seen as a specific
exception to the general right to marry whomever one chooses. Congress has recently passed
the Defense of Marriage Act which makes it illegal for the federal government to recognize any
gay marriages. Benjamin Geden, Ballot Effort Eyes Gay Marriage Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, July 25,
2001, at B2. This was on the heels of the Hawaii State Supreme Court opinion which held that
disallowing same sex marriages is a violation of the state Equal Protection Clause. Id.
147 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) ("I believe that the right of privacy in
the marital relation is fundamental and basic ... ").
148 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (holding that a Georgia statute which restricted
abortions was unconstitutional).
149 Case, supra note 115, 67 A.L.R.3d at 1272-73.
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normal marriage customs from being followed.)' This kind of deci-
sion seems to fit squarely within justice Blackmun's language.
The dialogue in Henne between the majority and the dissent con-
cerning whether parents should have a fundamental right to name
their children mirrors the argument that the right to change one's
own name upon marriage should similarly be a fundamental right.
The court in Henne ultimately decided that it was not a fundamental
right to name one's child without restrictions, but Judge Arnold, dis-
senting in part, disagreed.'5' The majority argued:
The custom in this country has always been that a child born in lawful
wedlock receives the surname of the father at birth,... and that a child
born out of wedlock receives the surname of the mother at birth ....
[W]e can find no American tradition to support the extension of the
right of privacy to cover the right of a parent to give a child a surname
with which that child has no legally recognized parental connection. 
52
Judge Arnold conceded that it had never been the custom to give a
child a surname that is neither the father's nor mother's, but argued
that the majority had narrowed the issue and did not have the right
focus: "by the same token, there is no solid tradition of legislation
denying any such right, and under Michael H., that is the relevant
question. "5  The dispute between the majority and the dissent in
Henne is not really over the scope or importance of the right to name
one's children, but focuses on whether this right has been granted or
disallowed throughout history. The majority argues that custom has
never granted the right to give the child an unmarried father's sur-
1 For example, in Scottish culture, it is the custom for the man to take his wife's surname
upon marriage. See Bysiewicz, supra note 9.
151 Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arnold, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part) ("The fundamental right of privacy, in my view, includes the right of parents to
name their own children.").
152 Id. at 1214-15 (holding that the right to name a child "McKenzie" a name other than that
of the father or mother is not deeply rooted in American tradition and thus not fundamental).
153 Id. at 1219 (Arnold, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Arnold was writing
of the 1989 plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Because no major-
ity was reached, the opinion is not binding on the Eighth Circuit, but from the plurality and
dissenting opinions, the Justices would agree with the above point thatJudge Arnold made. In
the Michael H. case, the California courts rejected Michael H.'s claims that he was the father of
the child in question even when blood tests established a 98.07% probability because the child's
mother, Carole, was married to another man at the time. justice Scalia denied labeling Michael
H.'s parental right as fundamental because "our traditions have protected the marital family
(Carole, [her husband], and the child they acknowledge to be theirs) against the sort of claim
Michael asserts." Id. When speaking of very general rights such as paternity rights, Justice
Scalia focused the analysis on whether such rights had ever been protected, and whether such
rights had ever been denied, finding in that case the latter. Likewise,Justice Brennan's dissent,
while objecting to Justice Scalia's narrowing of the issue, also zeroed in on whether the right
had ever been denied or protected. It is easy to see that both would agree that whether such
rights have been denied is a related issue.
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name, but the dissent points out that laws have never disallowed that
right.
The analysis of whether there exists a fundamental right to
change one's name nonfraudulently upon marriage is the same un-
der the reasoning of both the majority and the dissent in Henne. The
right to change one's name at all has always been protected by the
courts, and only in recent years have statutory methods replaced this
right, with the great majority of states retaining both the common law
and statutory rights. In addition, the ability to change one's name
upon marriage has been a long standing custom has never been disal-
lowed or restricted by statute as long as it was not for a fraudulent
purpose. Seemingly, the issue plaguing the Henne court would not be
a problem as being able to change one's name nonfraudulently upon
marriage has always been a protected right and never been denied.
Fundamental rights have been denied when not "deeply rooted in
this nation's history and tradition," but the right to change one's
name upon marriage would pass that test as well."" Certainly if we
narrowed the issue to the right of a man to take his wife's last name
automatically upon marriage, we would find no precedent in the na-
tion's history and thus the majority in Henne might have a problem
with calling that a fundamental right. However, while custom might
have dictated a different course of events, the law is clear that men
have actually always had the option to change their name at any
time-including upon marriage. There also have never been restric-
tions on this common law right. There is no question whether this
right is deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition-it clearly
is.
Therefore to change one's name nonfraudulently upon marriage
would seemingly fall within the wide net that the Court has cast in
giving fundamental rights to people to make decisions about their
marriage and their identity. Changing one's name nonfraudulently is
deeply rooted in the history and tradition of the United States as
passed down from England. And although it has never been the cus-
tom for men to change their name upon marriage in this country, it
is clear that it has always been their right to do so. This legal right
must be distinguished from the general practice that has prevailed in
the past. Just because only a small number of people have availed
themselves of such a right does not mean that the right should be ab-
154 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (holding that the right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy is not fundamental because it is not deeply rooted in this nation's history and
tradition). See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Harlan, J., con-
curring) ("Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family pre-
cisely because the institution for the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion.").
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brogated or deemed not to exist. For example, if only five percent of
the population used contraceptives, it would not follow that the right
to use them is not fundamental.
155
Declaring this a fundamental right would not pose any substantial
problems to the States. First and foremost, the right argued for in
this article is not a general fundamental right to change one's name,
but only a fundamental right for a spouse to take his or her spouse's
name upon marriage. This is a very narrow right which would not in-
clude the same kind of problems that a general name change right
would present. For example, while fraud may be a significant conern
if the states were to allow anyone to officially adopt any name they
choose, it is much less of a concern in the marriage context. Consid-
ering the social and monetary cost of getting married, it is unlikely
that many people would use marriage fraudulently solely to effectuate
a name change. The problems which would be faced in declaring
changing one's name in any circumstance a fundamental right are
less at issue when the right is limited to marriage.
Supposing a right to change one's name nonfraudulently upon
marriage was recognized as fundamental, any restrictions on that
right would have to be narrowly tailored to meet compelling state in-
terests."% States may argue that declaring this a fundamental right
would tie their hands in preventing fraud. They would be right in
noting that passing strict scrutiny is difficult, but, echoing Justice
O'Connor's words in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, it is not true
that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." 57 As noted
above, it was the common law right to change one's name as long as
it wasn't done for fraudulent purposes. There is little argument
whether this would be a compelling state interest. It has never been
the right of someone to change their name for fraudulent purposes.
Besides achieving a compelling state interest, any restriction
placed on the right must be narrowly tailored. A state may argue that
a name change upon marriage right could be abused by two people
getting married just to effectuate a name change. As previously dis-
cussed, it is unlikely that two people would marry just to effectuate a
name change, but if a state were very concerned with this right being
abused, perhaps a state could have restrictions on choosing totally
new names and limit marital name changes to only the wife's sur-
155 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking clown a state law which made
using birth control by a married couple illegal).
156 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("'lere certain 'fundamental rights' are in-
volved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only a 'compel-
ling state interest,' and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interest at stake.") (citation omitted).
157 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny
is the proper standard of review for all racial classifications).
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name, the husband's surname, or both names hyphenated. If this
were done, it is very unlikely that this right would be abused to con-
ceal one's identity."" The same argument also applies for current
provisions in name change statutes which put additional restrictions
on sex offenders and recently released felons. Marriage would be a
very costly and burdensome way to try to conceal their identities, but
even so reasonable restrictions put on such a class of people would
probably withstand strict scrutiny. 59
In short, declaring the right to change one's name upon marriage
as fundamental would not pose any substantial problems for states. It
is a right that can be traced to the common law of England and has
always been protected. It is certainly deeply rooted in our nation's
history and tradition. In addition, it follows from the long line of
precedent set by the United States Supreme Court that prevents gov-
ernment from intruding into the marital relationship and establish
that we have the right to make decisions concerning our own identity.
CONCLUSION
Margaret Eve Spencer, in writing to persuade state lawmakers and
the court system to recognize a woman's right to retain her maiden
name wrote:
There are doubtless many women who would freely choose under such a
law to take their husbands' names upon marriage, from conviction or
convenience. However, there are also many women who would choose to
retain their maiden names. The function of the law should be to afford
each woman the right to that choice 1'
Decades after this right was granted to women, I now ask state law-
makers and the court system to recognize the same for men: that
men have the right to the choice between retaining their birth sur-
name or adopting their wife's surname. As previously noted, many
states have drafted legislation which heads in that direction including
the laws of New York and Hawaii. These states should serve as a
model for other lawmakers. The fact remains, though, that most
states marital name change statutes violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that they do not provide the
same choices to men that they now do for women. The victories won
by women in the last few decades with regard to marital name change
choice should not give women greater rights than men now have.
158 Certainly allowing the wife and husband to hyphenate their name would not facilitate
fraud as each of the original names is included in the new hyphenated name.
159 For example, for felons and sex offenders, any name changes could be automatically re-
ported to police databases, parole officers, or other law enforcement personnel such that the
name change could not be used to conceal their true identity.
160 Spencer, supra note 116, at 690.
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Even in states with gender neutral laws, the Court should recognize a
fundamental right to change one's name upon marriage. The right
is deeply rooted in our nation and tradition, and is directed to the
very core of our identity-our own name. It follows easily from other
fundamental rights and the language used in those opinions saying
that we have a right to control our own identity and make decisions
about marriage. Names are no trivial matter, but represent our very
core to society, and lawmakers and courts should not consider any
denial of name change rights as merely de minimis. As Erica Jong
wrote, "To name oneself is the first act of both the poet and the revo-
lutionary. When we take away the right to an individual name, we
symbolically take away the right to be an individual. '"' 61 '
1II
ERICAJONG, HOWTO SAVEYOUR OWN LIFE: A NOVEL (1977).
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